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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the performance of physical layer security over Fluctuating Beckmann (FB) fading
channel which is an extended model of both the κ − µ shadowed and the classical Beckmann distributions.
Specifically, the average secrecy capacity (ASC), secure outage probability (SOP), the lower bound of SOP (SOPL),
and the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) are derived in exact closed-form expressions using
two different values of the fading parameters, namely, m and µ which represent the multipath and shadowing
severity impacts, respectively. Firstly, when the fading parameters are arbitrary values, the performance metrics
are derived in exact closed-form in terms of the extended generalised bivariate Fox’s H-function (EGBFHF) that
has been widely implemented in the open literature. In the second case, to obtain simple mathematically tractable
expressions in terms of analytic functions as well as to gain more insight on the behaviour of the physical layer
security over Fluctuating Beckmann fading channel models, m and µ are assumed to be integer and even numbers,
respectively. The numerical results of this analysis are verified via Monte Carlo simulations.
Index Terms
Fluctuating Beckmann fading channel, average secrecy capacity, secure outage probability, probability of strictly
positive secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon’s information-theoretic notion of perfect secrecy has been developed by Wyner via suggesting
the wiretap channel. In the notion of this channel, an eavesdropper is presented when a legitimate user,
namely, Alice, communicates with the intended receiver which is called Bob [1]. Consequently, the
performance of the physical layer security over different fading channel models has been widely analysed
in the open literature. For instance, the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC), the secure
outage probability (SOP), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) when the wireless channels subject
2to the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading channel are given in [2] and [3],
respectively. In [4], the SPSC when both the main and eavesdropper channels undergo Rician fading
channel is derived. The SOP and the SPSC of the physical layer using Rician and Nakagami-m fading
conditions for the Bob and the eavesdropper wireless channels are given in [5]. The Weibull fading channel
model is used in [6] and [7] to study the SPSC and ASC, respectively.
Recently, many works have been implemented using various generalized fading distributions that unify
most of the well-known channel models. In addition, they provide results closer to the practical data
than the conventional distributions, namely, Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, and Nakagami-n. In [8], the ASC
over κ − µ fading channel that is used to model the line-of-sight (LoS) communication environment is
derived. The performance of the physical layer security in non-linear communication scenario is analysed
in [9] and [10] via utilising the α − µ fading condition. Moreover, the ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and
the SPSC of the physical layer over α− µ fading using the Fox’s H-function channel model which is a
unified framework for a variety of distributions are presented in [11]. The ASC using the κ−µ/α−µ and
α− µ/κ− µ fading scenarios for the main/eavesdropper channels is given in [12]. The more generalised
fading channels α− κ− µ and α− η − µ are used in [13] to derive the SOPL and its asymptotic value.
These fading distributions are provided in a single model which is α − η − κ − µ that is also used to
represent both the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel of the classic Wyner’s wiretap model in
[14].
The wireless may also affected by the multipath and shadowing simultaneously. Accordingly, the
performance metrics of the physical layer security over composite fading channels have been also derived
by several efforts in the open literature. For example, the analysis in [15]-[17] are investigated over
generalised-K (KG) fading channel which is a composite of Nakagami-m/gamma distributions using
different methods. In [11] and [18], the Fisher-Snedecor F distribution that is proposed as an alternative
approach for the KG fading condition via employing the inverse Nakagami-m distribution instead of
gamma model is used to derive the expression of the ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC of the
physical layer. The ASC and the SOP over κ − µ shadowed fading are given in [19] for integer fading
parameters as well as in terms of the derivative of the incomplete moment generating function (IMGF)
framework that is included a bivariate confluent hypergeometric function Φ2(.). This channel model is
also utilised in [20] to analyse the SOPL and SPSC using the exact probability density function (PDF)
and the Gamma distribution as an approximate approach. However, the results in both efforts are either
3included double infinite series or approximated. Therefore, the authors in [21] have extensively analysed
the performance of the physical layer security over κ−µ shadowed fading channel using exact closed-form
analytic expressions for both scenarios of the values of the fading parameters.
More recent, the so-called Fluctuating Beckmann (FB) fading channel has been proposed as an extended
model of the κ−µ shadowed and the classical Beckmann distributions [22]. Thus, it includes the one-sided
Gaussian, Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Rician, κ−µ, η−µ, η−κ, Beckmann, Rician shadowed and the κ−µ
shadowed distributions as special cases. Hence, the FB fading channel is more generalised than the κ−µ
shadowed fading. In addition to [22], the aforementioned fading channel model has been utilised by only
one previous work via studying the effective rate of communication system [23].
Motivated by there is no work has been achieved to analyse the secrecy performance of the physical
layer over FB fading channels, this paper is dedicated to investigate this analysis. Our main contributions
are summarised as follows:
• Analysing the performance of the physical layer security when both the main and wiretap channels
are subjected to FB fading channel models. In particular, novel exact closed-form mathematically
tractable expressions of the ASC, SOP, SOPL, and SPSC are derived.
• When the fading parameters, namely, µ and m which represent the real extension of multipath clusters
and shadowing severity index, respectively are arbitrary numbers, the secrecy performance metrics
are obtained in terms of the extended generalised bivariate Fox’s H-function (EGBFHF). Although,
this function is not available in the popular mathematical software packages such as MATLAB and
MATHEMATICA, it has been implemented by several works such as [10] and [24].
• To earn more insights into the behaviour of the physical layer security as well as the impact of the
parameters of the FB fading model via using simple exact closed-from analytic expressions of the
aforementioned performance metrics, µ and m are assumed to even and integer values. Consequently,
the derived results are obtained in simple mathematical functions that are presented in all software
packages.
• From the provided literature in this work, the ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC for some
special cases of the FB fading model such as Beckmann have not been yet introduced due to the
complexity of their PDF and cumulative distribution function (CDF). However, these expressions can
be deduced from our derived expressions because the FB fading model is a versatile representation
of many distributions such as κ− µ shadowed and Beckmann.
4Organization: Section II is divided into two subsections. In the first subsection, the system model that is
used in this work is described whereas the general and limited formats of the probability density function
(PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of FB fading channel are given in the second
subsection. The ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC for two cases of the values of µ and shadowing
parameters are derived in Sections III, IV, V, and VI, respectively. Section VII explains the performance of
the physical layer security over some special cases of FB fading channel. In Section VIII, the Monte Carlo
simulations and numerical results are presented. Finally, some conclusions are highlighted in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
A. System Model
Wyner’s wiretap channel model has been proposed three different nodes with two wireless communica-
tion links [1]. The first link is between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver which are called Alice
and Bob, respectively via main channel. Thus, Bob’s channel state information (CSI) can be known by
Alice. On the other side, the second wireless communication link describes the wiretap channel between
the Alice and an external receiver which is named the eavesdropper (Eve). Accordingly, perfect knowledge
of Eve’s channel CSI can not be assumed and hence information-theoretic security can not be introduced.
This case is happened when Eve is unknown eavesdropper and that makes Alice unable to access it’s CSI.
In this paper, the main and wiretap channels are supposed to be independent and they subject to quasi-
static FB fading channels. In addition, Alice, Bob, and Alice are equipped with a single antenna and
perfect knowledge of the CSI of both Bob and Eve are assumed. When Alice transmits the signal s(n),
the received signals rl(n) at both Bob and Eve is given as [20]
rl(n) = hl(n)s(n) + wl(n). (1)
where l ∈ {D,E}, D, and E stand for Bob, and eavesdropper, respectively. Moreover, hl(n) and wl(n)
are the FB fading channel and the additive white Gaussian noise that has zero mean and fixed variance,
respectively.
5B. The PDF and CDF of Fluctuating Beckmann Fading Channel Model
Case 1: The PDF of the instantaneous SNR γl, fγl(γl), for the destination (Bob), D, and the
eavesdropper, E, channels using FB fading channel model is given by [22, eq. (5)]
fγl(γl) =
Ωl
Γ(µl)
γµl−1l Φ
(4)
2
(
µl
2
−ml, µl
2
−ml, ml, ml;µl;− γl
γ¯l
√
ηlα2l
,− γl
√
ηl
γ¯l
√
α2l
,−γlc1l
γ¯l
,−γlc2l
γ¯l
)
. (2)
where l ∈ {D,E}, Ωl = α
ml−
µl
2
2l
γ¯
µl
l
α
ml
1l
, α2l =
4ηl
µ2
l
(1+ηl)2(1+κl)2
, γ¯l is the average SNR, ml is the shadowing
severity parameter, Γ(a) =
∫∞
0
xa−1e−xdx is the Gamma function and Φ(4)2 (.) is the multivariate confluent
hypergeometric function defined in [25, eq. (1.7.10)]. Furthermore, c1l,2l are the roots of α1ls
2 + βls+ 1
with
α1l = α2l +
2κl(̺
2
l + ηl)
ml(1 + ̺
2
l )µl(1 + ηl)(1 + κl)
2
.
βl = − 1
1 + κl
[
2
µl
+
κl
ml
]
. (3)
where κl =
p2
l
+q2
l
µl(σ2xl
+σ2yl
)
, ̺2l =
p2
l
q2
l
, ηl =
σ2xl
σ2yl
, σ2xl = E[X
2
il
], σ2yl = E[Y
2
il
], pil and qil are real numbers for ith
cluster and X2il and Y
2
il
mutually independent Gaussian random processes.
The CDF of the FB fading channel condition is expressed as [22, eq. (6)]
Fγl(γl) =
Ωl
Γ(µl + 1)
γµll Φ
(4)
2
(
µl
2
−ml, µl
2
−ml, ml, ml;µl+1;− γl
γ¯l
√
ηlα2l
,− γl
√
ηl
γ¯l
√
α2l
,−γlc1l
γ¯l
,−γlc2l
γ¯l
)
. (4)
Case 2: When m is integer number and µ is even number, the PDF and the CDF are, respectively,
given by [22, eqs. (10) and (14)]
fγl(γl) = Ωl
Nl(ml,µl)∑
il=1
e
−ϑl
γ¯l
γl
|ωil |∑
jl=1
Ailjl
(jl − 1)!γ
jl−1
l . (5)
and
Fγl(γl) = 1 + Ωl
Nl(ml,µl)∑
il=1
e
−ϑl
γ¯l
γl
|ωil |∑
jl=1
Biljl
(jl − 1)!γ
jl−1
l (6)
where ωl = [ml, ml,
µl
2
− ml, µl2 − ml], ϑl = [c1l, c2l, µl(1+ηl)(1+κl)2ηl ,
µl(1+ηl)(1+κl)
2
], Nl(ml, µl) = 2[1 +
u(µl
2
, ml)], u(.) is the unit step function, and Ailjl and Biljl are calculated by [22, eq.(51)] and [22, eq.
(52)], respectively.
6III. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
The normalised ASC that is defined as the difference between the capacity of the main and wiretap
channels over instantaneous SNR, γ, can be calculated by C¯s = I1 + I2 − I3 [15, eq. (6)] where I1, I2,
and I3 are respectively expressed as
I1 =
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + γD)fD(γD)FE(γD)dγD. (7)
I2 =
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + γE)fE(γE)FD(γE)dγE. (8)
I3 =
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + γE)fE(γE)dγE. (9)
Theorem 1: The exact closed-form expressions for I1, I2, and I3 using the PDF and the CDF of Case 1
are given in (10), (11), and (12), respectively, at the bottom of this page where Hs,r:a,b;...;an,bnp,q:c,d;...,dn,cn [.] denotes
the EGBFHF that is defined in [26, A.1]. To the best of the authors knowledge, (10), (11), and (12) are
novel.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 1: For Case 2, I1, I2, and I3 are respectively derived in simple analytic exact closed-form
expressions as shown in (13), (14), and (15), at the top this page. Substituting these expressions in
C¯s = I1 + I2 − I3 and performing some straightforward manipulations, novel result is obtained as given
in (16) at the top of this page.
Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. SECURE OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The SOP is defined as the probability of falling the instantaneous secrecy capacity, Cs, of the system
below the target secrecy threshold, Rs, i.e., P(Cs < Rs) where P(.) stands for the probability symbol.
Mathematically, the SOP can be evaluated by [20, eq. (20)]
SOP =
∫ ∞
0
FD(θγE + θ − 1)fE(γE)dγE (17)
where θ = exp(Rs) ≥ 1 with Rs ≥ 0 denotes the target secrecy threshold.
7I1 =
ΩDΩE
[Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
×H1,2:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,12,4:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
[
1
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
,
c1D
γ¯D
,
c2D
γ¯D
, 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
,
c1E
γ¯E
,
c2E
γ¯E
∣∣∣∣
(1− µD − µE ; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1− µD − µE; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
(−µD − µE ; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1− µD; 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (−µE; 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
]
(10)
I2 =
ΩEΩD
[Γ(µE
2
−mE)Γ(µD2 −mD)Γ(mE)Γ(mD)]2
×H1,2:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,12,4:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
[
1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
,
c1E
γ¯E
,
c2E
γ¯E
, 1
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
,
c1D
γ¯D
,
c2D
γ¯D
∣∣∣∣
(1− µE − µD; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1− µE − µD; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
(−µE − µD; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1− µE; 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (−µD; 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
]
(11)
I3 =
ΩE
[Γ(µE −mE)Γ(mE)]2H
1,2:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
2,3:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
[
1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
,
c1E
γ¯E
,
c2E
γ¯E
∣∣∣∣
(1− µE, 1), (1− µE, 1)
(1− µE, 1), (−µE, 1), (−µE, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
]
(12)
Theorem 2: The SOP for Case 1 and Case 2 of the PDF and the CDF are expressed in exact closed-
form as shown in (18) and (19), respectively. In (19),
(
b
a
)
, b!
(b−a)! stands for the binomial coefficient [25,
eq. (1.1.16)] and (a)r is the Pochhammer symbol [25, eq. (1.1.15)]. Additionally, (19) is simpler than (18)
and hence better insights can be obtained for the SOP. To the best authors’ knowledge, (18) and (19) are
novel and mathematically tractable.
Proof: See Appendix C.
8I1 = ΩD
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
AiDjD
(jD − 1)!
[
Γ(jD)e
ϑiD
γ¯D
jD∑
k=1
Γ
(
k − jD, ϑiDγ¯D
)
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
)k +
ΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
BiEjE
(jE − 1)!Γ(jD + jE − 1)e
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
) jD+jE−1∑
r=1
Γ
(
r − jD − jE + 1, ϑiDγ¯D +
ϑiE
γ¯E
)
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)r−jD−jE+1
]
.
(13)
I2 = ΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjE
(jE − 1)!
[
Γ(jE)e
ϑiE
γ¯E
jE∑
k=1
Γ
(
k − jE , ϑiEγ¯E
)
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
)k +
ΩD
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
BiDjD
(jD − 1)!Γ(jE + jD − 1)e
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
ϑiD
γ¯D
) jE+jD−1∑
r=1
Γ
(
r − jE − jD + 1, ϑiEγ¯E +
ϑiD
γ¯D
)
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
ϑiD
γ¯D
)r−jE−jD+1
]
(14)
I3 = ΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjEe
ϑiE
γ¯E
jE∑
k=1
Γ
(
k − jE , ϑiEγ¯E
)
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
)k (15)
C¯s =ΩD
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
AiDjDe
ϑiD
γ¯D
jD∑
k=1
Γ
(
k − jD, ϑiDγ¯D
)
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
)k
+ ΩDΩE
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
Γ(jD + jE − 1)
Γ(jE)Γ(jD)
[AiDjDBiEjE + AiEjEBiDjD ]e
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)
jD+jE−1∑
r=1
Γ
(
r − jD − jE + 1, ϑiDγ¯D +
ϑiE
γ¯E
)
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)r−jD−jE+1 . (16)
V. LOWER BOUND OF SOP
According to [6], the SOPL can be obtained from (17) when γE tends to ∞. Consequently, the SOPL
can be computed by
SOPL =
∫ ∞
0
FD(θγE)fE(γE)dγE
≤ SOP (20)
9SOP =
ΩEΩD(θ − 1)µD+µE
θµE [Γ(µE
2
−mE)Γ(µD2 −mD)Γ(mE)Γ(mD)]2
×H1,1:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,12,3:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
[
θ−1
θγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
(θ−1)√ηE
θγ¯E
√
α2E
,
(θ−1)c1E
θγ¯E
,
(θ−1)c2E
θγ¯E
, θ−1
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,
(θ−1)√ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
,
(θ−1)c1D
γ¯D
,
(θ−1)c2D
γ¯D
∣∣∣∣ (1− µE ; 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (−µD; 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)(−µE − µD; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (−µE; 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (−µD; 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
]
(18)
SOP = 1 + ΩDΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjE
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
BiDjD
Γ(jD)
e
ϑiD
γ¯D
(1−θ)
jD−1∑
r=0
(
jD − 1
r
)
θr(jE)r
(θ − 1)r−jD+1
(
θϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)r+jE (19)
Theorem 3: The SOPL when µl and ml are arbitrary numbers, namely, Case 1, is presented in (21)
whereas for Case 2, the SOPL is given in (22) where φ = θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
+ 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
. One can see that (21)
and (22) are obtained in simple exact closed-form expressions. To the best of our knowledge, (21) and
(22) are also new.
Proof: See Appendix D.
SOPL =
ΩEΩDθ
µD
φµE+µDΓ(µE
2
−mE)Γ(µD2 −mD)[Γ(mE)Γ(mD)]2
×H0,1:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,11,2:1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1;1,1
[
ηE−1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
√
ηEα2E c1E−1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
√
ηEα2E c2E−1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
, (ηD−1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,
(
√
ηDα2D c1D−1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,
(
√
ηDα2D c2D−1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
∣∣∣∣ (1− µD − µE; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)(1− µE; 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), (−µD; 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mE − µE2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mE , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣
(1−mE , 1)
(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1 +mD − µD2 , 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
∣∣∣∣(1−mD, 1)(0, 1)
]
(21)
SOPL = 1 + ΩEΩD
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjE
Γ(jE)
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
θjD−1
Γ(jD + jE − 1)
Γ(jD)
BiDjD(
θϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)jD+jE−1
(22)
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VI. PROBABILITY OF STRICTLY POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY
The SPSC refers to the probability of positive Cs, namely, P(Cs > 0). Therefore, it can be calculated
by [18, eq. (11)]
SPSC = 1− SOPL for θ = 1 (23)
It can be observed that the SPSC for Case 1 and Case 2 can be obtained from (21) and (22),
respectively, via substituting θ = 1 and plugging the results in (23).
VII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY OVER SPECIAL CASES OF FB FADING CHANNEL MODEL
It has been mentioned in [22], the FB fading channel is a versatile model for nearly most of the well
known distributions. Accordingly, our derived secrecy performance metrics can be utilised for different
scenarios of wireless communications channels that have not been yet done in the literature due to the
complexity of their statistical characterization. For example, when κ = K, µ = 1, m → ∞, η = q, and
̺ = r the Beckmann distribution is the result. Furthermore, the PDF and the CDF of κ−mu shadowed
fading obtained from (2) or (5) and (4) or (6), respectively after plugging plugging κ = K, µ = µ,
m = m, η = 1, and ∀̺. The ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC for η−mu fading condition can be
deduced by substituting κ = 0, µ = µ, η = η and vanishing of both m and ̺ in our derived expressions.
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Fig. 1. ASC versus λ for γ¯E = 5 dB, µE = 1.5, mE = 1.5, κE = 1, ηE = 0.1, ̺
2
E = 0.1 and different values of the fading parameters
of Bob.
11
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
λ (dB)
S
O
P
&
S
O
P
L
 
 
µD = 1.5, mD = 0.5, κD = 5, ηD = 0.1, ̺
2
D = 0.1
µD = 3.5, mD = 0.5, κD = 5, ηD = 0.1, ̺
2
D = 0.1
µD = 3.5, mD = 2.5, κD = 5, ηD = 0.1, ̺
2
D = 0.1
µD = 3.5, mD = 2.5, κD = 1, ηD = 0.1, ̺
2
D = 0.1
µD = 3.5, mD = 2.5, κD = 1, ηD = 0.5, ̺
2
D = 0.1
µD = 3.5, mD = 2.5, κD = 1, ηD = 0.5, ̺
2
D = 10
SOPL
Simulation
Fig. 2. SOP and SOPL versus λ for γ¯E = 5 dB, µE = 1.5, mE = 1.5, κE = 1, ηE = 0.1, ̺
2
E = 0.1, Rs = 1 and different values of the
fading parameters of Bob.
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Fig. 3. SPSC versus λ for γ¯E = 5 dB, µE = 1.5, mE = 1.5, κE = 1, ηE = 0.1, ̺
2
E = 0.1, Rs = 1 and different values of the fading
parameters of Bob.
VIII. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the numerical results of this work are verified via Monte Carlo simulations with 107
realizations. The parameters of main and wiretap channels are assumed to be independent and non-
identically distributed random variables. In all figures, the markers represents the numerical results,
whereas the solid lines explain their simulation counterparts.
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the ASC, the SOP & SOPL and the SPSC versus λ = γ¯D/γ¯E, respectively,
for γ¯E = 5 dB, µE = 1.5, mE = 1.5, κE = 1, ηE = 0.1, ̺
2
E = 0.1 and different values of the fading
parameters of Bob. From these figures, one can see that the secrecy performance improves when µD, mD,
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Fig. 4. ASC versus γ¯D for µD = µE = 2.5, mD = mE = 1.5, κD = κE = 3, ηD = ηE = 0.5, ̺
2
D = ̺
2
E = 0.2 and different values of
γ¯E .
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Fig. 5. SOP & SOPL versus γ¯D for µD = µE = 2.5, mD = mE = 1.5, κD = κE = 3, ηD = ηE = 0.5, ̺
2
D = ̺
2
E = 0.2, Rs = 1 and
different values of γ¯E .
ηD, or/and ̺
2
D increase. This is because the increasing in µD or/and mD correspond to a large number of
the multipath clusters and the less shadowing impact at the Bob, respectively. Moreover, the improving
in the values of ηD, or/and ̺
2
D mean a high power rate at the Bob, i.e., the total power of the in-phase
components. on the contrary, the decreasing of κD increases the values of all the studied performance
metrics. The main reason is the parameter κD represents the ratio between the total power of the dominant
components and the total power of the scattered waves. For example, in Fig. 1, at mD = 0.5, κD = 5,
ηD = 0.1, ̺
2 = 0.1 and λ = 15 dB (fixed), the ASC for µD = 3.5 is nearly 10% higher than µD = 1.5. In
the same context, when µD = 3.5 and mD changes from 0.5 to 2.5, the ASC is increased by roughly 25%.
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Fig. 6. SPSC versus γ¯D for µD = µE = 2.5, mD = mE = 1.5, κD = κE = 3, ηD = ηE = 0.5, ̺
2
D = ̺
2
E = 0.2, Rs = 1 and different
values of γ¯E .
Furthermore, the ASC for the scenario µD = 3.5, mD = 2.5, κD = 1, ηD = 0.1, and ̺
2
D = 0.1 at λ = 15
dB is approximately 2.139 whereas for ηD = 0.5 is 3.293 which is less than for ̺
2
D = 10 by nearly 5%.
On the other side, the ASC for the previous scenario is decreased by roughly 16% when κD becomes 5.
The impacts of the fading parameters on the provided results in Fig. 1 are confirmed by Figs. 2 and 3.
In addition, from these figures, it is clear that the secrecy performance enhances when λ increases. This
refers to the high γ¯D in comparison with the γ¯E which would lead to make the Alice-Bob channel better
than the Alice-Eve channel.
Figs. 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate the ASC, the SOP & SOPL and the SPSC versus γ¯D, respectively, for
µD = µE = 2.5, mD = mE = 1.5, κD = κE = 3, ηD = ηE = 0.5, ̺
2
D = ̺
2
E = 0.2 and different values
of γ¯E. As expected, a clear improvement can be noticed in the secrecy performance of the considered
system when γ¯E reduces. The reason is the large deterioration of the wiretap channel. For instance, in
Fig. 4, at γ¯D = 15 dB (fixed), the ASC for γ¯E = 7 dB and γ¯E = 3 dB are approximately 1.598 and 2.189,
respectively.
Another confirmation is presented in Figs. 2 and 5 via providing both SOP and SOPL which is less
than or equal to the SOP of the same scenario.
More importantly, the numerical results and Monte Carlo simulations are in perfect match for any given
scenario.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper was dedicated to study the secrecy behaviour of the physical layer over Fluctuating Beckmann
fading channel model. To be specific, the ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC, were derived in novel
exact closed-form expressions by using two cases for the values of the fading parameters. In the first case,
the derived results were expressed in terms of EGBFHF. On the other side, the second case provided simple
exact mathematically tractable closed-form expressions via assuming µ and m for both Bob and Eve are
even number and integer number, respectively. From the given results, a reduction in the values of the
ASC, the SOP, the SOPL, and the SPSC can be observed when the value of µ, m, η, or/and ̺2 of the
Bob decrease. However, the secrecy performances of the system improves when κ of the Bob or/and γE
reduce. The results of this work can be employed to analyse the secrecy performance of the physical layer
over a variety of fading channels with simple exact closed-form expressions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Substituting (2) and (4) in (7), this yields
I1 =
ΩDΩE
Γ(µD)Γ(µE + 1)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + γD)γ
µD+µE−1
D
× Φ(4)2
(
µD
2
−mD, µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD;− γD
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,− γD
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
,−γDc1D
γ¯D
,−γDc2D
γ¯D
)
× Φ(4)2
(
µE
2
−mE , µE
2
−mE , mE , mE;µE + 1;− γD
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,− γD
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
,−γDc1E
γ¯E
,−γDc2E
γ¯E
)
dγD.
(24)
The exact closed-form solution of the integral in (24) is not available in the open literature. Therefore,
to solve the above integral, we firstly express ln(.) in terms of Fox’s H-function (FHF) by using the
property [11, eq. (36)]
ln(1 + x) = H1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
(25)
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For the confluent Lauricella hypergeometric function Φ
(4)
2 (.), the following identity can be utilised [25,
1.ii, pp. 259]
Φ
(4)
2 (a1, a2, a3, a4; b;−x1t,−x2t,−x3t,−x4t) =
1
tb−1
L−1
{
Γ(b)
sb
(
1 +
x1
s
)−a1(
1 +
x2
s
)−a2(
1 +
x3
s
)−a3(
1 +
x4
s
)−a4
; s, t
}
(26)
where ℜ(b) > 0, ℜ(s) > 0, and {a1, a2, a3, a4} ∈ R and L−1(.) is the inverse Laplace transform.
To compute inverse Laplace transform, the following identity is recalled [26, eq. (1.43)]
(1 + x)−a =
1
Γ(a)
H1,11,1
[
x
∣∣∣∣(1− a, 1)(0, 1)
]
(27)
With the aid of (27) and using the definition of FHF that is presented in [26, eq. (1.2) and [26, eq.(1.3)],
the inverse Laplace transform of (26) can be rewritten as
L−1
{
Γ(b)
sb
(
1 +
x1
s
)−a1(
1 +
x2
s
)−a2(
1 +
x3
s
)−a3(
1 +
x4
s
)−a4
; s, t
}
=
Γ(b)
tb−1Γ(a1)Γ(a2)Γ(a3)Γ(a4)
1
(2πj)4
∫
R1
∫
R2
∫
R3
∫
R4
Γ(r1)Γ(a1 − r1)Γ(r2)Γ(a2 − r2)Γ(r3)Γ(a3 − r3)Γ(r4)Γ(a4 − r4)
x−r11 x
−r2
2 x
−r3
3 x
−r4
4 L−1
{
sr1+r2+r3+r4−b; s, t
}
dr1dr2dr3dr4
(28)
where j =
√−1 and Ri for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} represent the suitable closed contours in the complex ri-plane.
The inverse Laplace transform in (28) can be calculated as follows
L−1
{
sr1+r2+r3+r4−b; s, t
}
=
tb−r1−r2−r3−r4−1
Γ(b− r1 − r2 − r3 − r4) (29)
Substituting (29) into (28) to yield
L−1
{
Γ(b)
sb
(
1 +
x1
s
)−a1(
1 +
x2
s
)−a2(
1 +
x3
s
)−a3(
1 +
x4
s
)−a4
; s, t
}
=
Γ(b)
Γ(a1)Γ(a2)Γ(a3)Γ(a4)
tb−1
1
(2πj)4
∫
R1
∫
R2
∫
R3
∫
R4
Γ(r1)Γ(a1 − r1)Γ(r2)Γ(a2 − r2)Γ(r3)Γ(a3 − r3)Γ(r4)Γ(a4 − r4)
Γ(b− r1 − r2 − r3 − r4)
(xt)−r11 (xt)
−r2
2 (xt)
−r3
3 (xt)
−r4
4 dr1dr2dr3dr4
(30)
Plugging (25) in (24) and employing (26) and (30) for both confluent Lauricella hypergeometric
functions Φ
(4)
2 (.), we have
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I1 =
ΩDΩE
[Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)8∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R8
[
∏8
j=1 Γ(rj)][
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µD
2
−mD − rj)Γ(mD − rj+2)Γ(µE2 −mE − rj+4)Γ(mE − rj+6)]
Γ(µD − r1 − · · · − r4)Γ(1 + µE − r5 − · · · − r8)
1
(γ¯D
√
ηDα2D)
−r1
( √
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
)−r2(c1D
γ¯D
)−r3(c2D
γ¯D
)−r4 1
(γ¯E
√
ηEα2E)
−r5
( √
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
)−r6
(
c1E
γ¯E
)−r7(c2E
γ¯E
)−r8 ∫ ∞
0
γ
µD+µE−
∑
8
j=1 rj−1
D ln(1 + γD)dγD︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
dr1 · · ·dr8. (31)
With the help of [27, eq. (4.293.10)], the inner integral, K1, of (31) can be be computed in exact
closed-form as
K1 =
∫ ∞
0
γ
µD+µE−
∑
8
j=1 rj−1
D ln(1 + γD)dγD
=
π
(µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)sin((µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)π)
(32)
Recalling the identities a = Γ(1+a)
Γ(a)
[27, eq. (8.331.1)] and sin(πa) = pi
aΓ(1−a) [27, eq. (8.334.3)], (32)
becomes
K1 =
[Γ(µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)]
2Γ(1− µD − µE +
∑8
j=1 rj)
Γ(1 + µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)
(33)
Inserting (33) in (31) with some mathematical manipulations, (34) is obtained as follows
I1 =
ΩDΩE
[Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)8
∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R8
[Γ(µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)]
2Γ(1− µD − µE +
∑8
j=1 rj)[
∏8
j=1 Γ(rj)]
Γ(1 + µD + µE −
∑8
j=1 rj)
[
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µD
2
−mD − rj)Γ(mD − rj+2)Γ(µE2 −mE − rj+4)Γ(mE − rj+6)]
Γ(µD − r1 − · · · − r4)Γ(1 + µE − r5 − · · · − r8)
1
(γ¯D
√
ηDα2D)
−r1( √
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
)−r2(c1D
γ¯D
)−r3(c2D
γ¯D
)−r4 1
(γ¯E
√
ηEα2E)
−r5
( √
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
)−r6(c1E
γ¯E
)−r7(c2E
γ¯E
)−r8
dr1 · · · dr8.
(34)
It can be noted that (34) can be written in exact closed-from in terms of the EGBFHF via using [26,
eq. (A.1)] and this completes the proof for (10).
It can be observed (10) can be utilised to evaluate (11) by replacing each D and E with E and D,
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respectively.
For I3, we Substitute (2) in (9) to yield
I3 =
ΩE
[Γ(µE
2
−mE)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)4
∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R4
[
∏4
j=1 Γ(rj)][
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µE
2
−mE − rj)Γ(mE − rj+2)]
Γ(µE − r1 − · · · − r4)
1
(γ¯E
√
ηEα2E)
−r1
( √
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
)−r2(c1E
γ¯E
)−r3(c2E
γ¯E
)−r4 ∫ ∞
0
γ
µE−
∑
4
j=1 rj−1
E ln(1 + γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
dr1 · · · dr4.
(35)
Following the same steps of computing K1 of (31), K2 is obtained as follows
K2 =
[Γ(µE −
∑4
j=1 rj)]
2Γ(1− µE +
∑4
j=1 rj)
Γ(1 + µE −
∑4
j=1 rj)
(36)
Substituting (36) in (35), we have
I3 =
ΩE
[Γ(µE
2
−mE)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)4
∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R4
Γ(1− µE +
∑4
j=1 rj)[Γ(µE −
∑4
j=1 rj)]
2
Γ(1 + µE −
∑4
j=1 rj)[
∏4
j=1 Γ(rj)]
[
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µE
2
−mE − rj)Γ(mE − rj+2)]
Γ(µE −
∑4
j=1 rj)
1
(γ¯E
√
ηEα2E)
−r1
( √
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
)−r2(c1E
γ¯E
)−r3(c2E
γ¯E
)−r4
dr1 · · ·dr4.
(37)
Invoking [26, eq. (A.1)], I3 in (37) is expressed in exact closed-form expression as provided in (12)
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
For Case 2, I1 can be calculated via inserting (5) and (6) in (7). Accordingly, this yields
I1 = ΩD
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
AiDjD
(jD − 1)!
[∫ ∞
0
γjD−1D ln(1 + γD)e
−ϑiD
γ¯D
γDdγD+
ΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
BiEjE
(jE − 1)!
∫ ∞
0
γjD+jE−2D ln(1 + γD)e
−
(
ϑiD
γ¯D
+
ϑiE
γ¯E
)
γDdγD
]
. (38)
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Both integrals of (38) can be computed in simple exact closed-form expressions with the aid of [28,
eq. (47)]
∫ ∞
0
xa−1ln(1 + x)e−bxdx = Γ(a)eb
a∑
k=1
Γ(k − a, b)
bk
(39)
Using (39) and doing some mathematical simplifications, I1 that is given in (13) is deduced and this
completes the proof.
Using D and E instead of E and D, respectively, in (13), the result is I2 for integer µl and ml as
shown in (14).
Similarly, after plugging (5) in (9) and using [28, eq. (47)], I3 is expressed in exact closed-form as
given in (15) which completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Inserting (2) and (4) in (17), the result is
SOP =
ΩDΩE
Γ(µE)Γ(µD + 1)
∫ ∞
0
(θγE + θ − 1)µDγµE−1E
× Φ(4)2
(
µE
2
−mE, µE
2
−mE , mE , mE;µE;− γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,− γE
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
,−γEc1E
γ¯E
,−γEc2E
γ¯E
)
× Φ(4)2
(
µD
2
−mD, µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD + 1;−(θγE + θ − 1)
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
,−(θγE + θ − 1)
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
,
− (θγE + θ − 1)c1D
γ¯D
,−(θγE + θ − 1)c2D
γ¯D
)
dγE. (40)
To compute the integral in (40), we recall (26) and (30) for both confluent Lauricella hypergeometric
functions Φ
(4)
2 (.). Hence, we have
SOP =
ΩDΩE
[Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)8∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R8
[
∏8
j=1 Γ(rj)][
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µE
2
−mE − rj)Γ(mE − rj+2)Γ(µD2 −mD − rj+4)Γ(mD − rj+6)]
Γ(1 + µE − r1 − · · · − r4)Γ(µD − r5 − · · · − r8)
1
(γ¯E
√
ηEα2E)
−r1
( √
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
)−r2(c1E
γ¯E
)−r3(c2E
γ¯E
)−r4 1
(γ¯D
√
ηDα2D)
−r5
( √
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
)−r6
(
c1D
γ¯D
)−r7(c2D
γ¯D
)−r8 ∫ ∞
0
γ
µE−
∑
4
j=1 rj−1
E (θγE + θ − 1)µD−
∑
8
j=5 rjdγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
dr1 · · ·dr8. (41)
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Performing some mathematical manipulations and using [27, eq. (3.194.3)], K3 of (41) can be evaluated
in exact closed-form as follows
K3 = θ−µE+
∑
4
j=1 rj(θ − 1)µD+µE−
∑
8
j=1 rjB(µE −
∑4
j=1rj,−µD − µE +
∑8
j=1rj) (42)
where B(., .) is the Beta function defined in [25, eq. (1.1.43)].
Invoking the identity B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)
Γ(x+y)
[25, eq. (1.1.47)], (42) can be rewritten as
K3 =
Γ(µE −
∑4
j=1rj)Γ(−µD − µE +
∑8
j=1rj)
Γ(−µD +
∑8
j=5rj)
θ−µE+
∑
4
j=1 rj(θ − 1)µD+µE−
∑
8
j=1 rj (43)
Plugging (43) in (41) to yield (44) that is given at the top of the next page
SOP =
ΩDΩE
[Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
(θ − 1)µD+µE
θµE
1
(2πj)8∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R8
[
∏8
j=1 Γ(rj)][
∏2
j=1 Γ(
µE
2
−mE − rj)Γ(mE − rj+2)Γ(µD2 −mD − rj+4)Γ(mD − rj+6)]
Γ(1 + µE − r1 − · · · − r4)Γ(µD − r5 − · · · − r8)
Γ(µE −
∑4
j=1rj)Γ(−µD − µE +
∑8
j=1rj)
Γ(−µD +
∑8
j=5rj)
(
(θ − 1)
θγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r1((θ − 1)√ηE
θγ¯E
√
α2E
)−r2
(
(θ − 1)c1E
θγ¯E
)−r3((θ − 1)c2E
θγ¯E
)−r4( (θ − 1)
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r5((θ − 1)√ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
)−r6((θ − 1)c1D
γ¯D
)−r7
(
(θ − 1)c2D
γ¯D
)−r8
dr1 · · · dr8. (44)
Again, [26, eq. (A.1)] is utilised for (44) to complete the proof of (18).
The SOP for Case 2 can calculated after substituting (5) and (6) in (17) and using the fact
∫∞
0
fγ(γ)dγ ,
1. Consequently, we have
SOP = 1 + ΩDΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjE
(jE − 1)!
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
BiDjD
(jD − 1)!∫ ∞
0
γjE−1E (θγE + θ − 1)jD−1e−
ϑiE
γ¯E
γE−(θγE+θ−1)
ϑiD
γ¯D dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
K4
(45)
Doing some mathematical manipulations on K4 of (45) to yield
K4 = (θ − 1)jD−1e−(θ−1)
ϑiD
γ¯D
∫ ∞
0
γjE−1E
(
1 +
θ
θ − 1γE
)jD−1
e
−
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
θϑiD
γ¯D
)
γEdγE (46)
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Employing the identity (1 + a)b =
∑b
k=0
(
b
k
)
ak [27, eq. (1.111)] in (46), we obtain
K4 = (θ − 1)jD−1e−(θ−1)
ϑiD
γ¯D
jD−1∑
r=0
(
jD − 1
r
)(
θ
θ − 1
)r ∫ ∞
0
γjE+r−1E e
−
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
θϑiD
γ¯D
)
γEdγE (47)
With the aid of [27, eq. (3.381.4)], the integral in (47) can be evaluated as follows
K4 = (θ − 1)jD−1e−(θ−1)
ϑiD
γ¯D
jD−1∑
r=0
(
jD − 1
r
)(
θ
θ − 1
)r
Γ(jE + r)(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
θϑiD
γ¯D
)jE+r (48)
Plugging (48) in (45) with some mathematical simplifications, the result is (19) which completes the
proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Substituting (2) and (4) in (20), this yields
SOPL =
ΩDΩE
Γ(µE)Γ(µD + 1)
θµD
∫ ∞
0
γµE+µD−1E
× Φ(4)2
(
µE
2
−mE, µE
2
−mE , mE , mE;µE;− γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,−
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
γE,−c1E
γ¯E
γE,−c2E
γ¯E
γE
)
× Φ(4)2
(
µD
2
−mD, µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD + 1;− θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,−
θ
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
γE,
− θc1D
γ¯D
γE ,−θc2D
γ¯D
γE
)
dγE. (49)
To calculate the integral in (49), the following property can be used [29, p. 177]
e−ciΦ(n)2
(
a1, · · · , an; b; c1, · · · , cn
)
= Φ
(n)
2
(
a1, ., ai−1, b− a1 − .− an, ai+1, ., an; b; c1 − ci, · · · ,
ci−1 − ci,−ci, ci+1 − ci, · · · , cn − ci
)
(50)
Accordingly, both confluent Lauricella hypergeometric functions Φ
(4)
2 (.) become
Φ
(4)
2
(
µE
2
−mE , µE
2
−mE , mE, mE ;µE;− γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,−
√
ηE
γ¯E
√
α2E
γE,−c1E
γ¯E
γE,−c2E
γ¯E
γE
)
= e
− γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E Φ
(4)
2
(
0,
µE
2
−mE , mE , mE;µE; γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
1− ηE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE,
1−√ηEα2Ec1E
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE,
1−√ηEα2Ec2E
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE
)
(51)
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and
Φ
(4)
2
(
µD
2
−mD, µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD + 1;− θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,−
θ
√
ηD
γ¯D
√
α2D
γE,−θc1D
γ¯D
γE ,−θc2D
γ¯D
γE
)
= e
− θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE
Φ
(4)
2
(
0,
µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD + 1; θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,
(1− ηD)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,
(1−√ηDα2Dc1D)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE ,
(1−√ηDα2Dc2D)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE
)
(52)
Inserting (51) and (52) in (49), we have (53) at the top of the next page.
SOPL =
ΩDΩE
Γ(µE)Γ(µD + 1)
θµD
∫ ∞
0
γµE+µD−1E e
−
(
1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
+ θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)
γE
× Φ(4)2
(
0,
µE
2
−mE , mE, mE ;µE; γE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
,
1− ηE
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE ,
1−√ηEα2Ec1E
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE,
1−√ηEα2Ec2E
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
γE
)
× Φ(4)2
(
0,
µD
2
−mD, mD, mD;µD + 1; θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE ,
(1− ηD)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,
(1−√ηDα2Dc1D)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE,
(1−√ηDα2Dc2D)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
γE
)
dγE. (53)
Recalling (26) and (30) for both Φ
(4)
2 (.) of (53) to yield (54) at the top of the next page
SOPL =
ΩDΩE
Γ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)[Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
θµ
1
(2πj)6
∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R6
[
∏6
j=1 Γ(rj)]Γ(
µE
2
−mE − r1)Γ(µD2 −mD − r4)[
∏3
j=2 Γ(mE − rj)Γ(mD − rj+3)]
Γ(µE − r1 − · · · − r3)Γ(1 + µD − r4 − · · · − r6)(√
ηEα2Ec1E − 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r1(√ηEα2Ec1E − 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r2(√ηEα2Ec2E − 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r3
(
(ηD − 1)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r4((√ηDα2Dc1D − 1)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r5((√ηDα2Dc2D − 1)θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r6
∫ ∞
0
γ
µD+µE−
∑
6
j=1 rj−1
E e
−
(
1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
+ θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)
γE
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
K5
dr1 · · · dr6. (54)
With the aid of [27, eq. (3.381.4)], K5 of (54) can be computed as follows
K5 =
Γ
(
µD + µE −
∑6
j=1 rj
)
φµD+µE−
∑
6
j=1 rj
(55)
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where φ = 1
γ¯E
√
ηEα2E
+ θ
γ¯D
√
ηDα2D
.
Plugging (55) in (56) and doing some mathematical operations, (56) is yielded as shown at the top of
the next page.
SOPL =
ΩDΩEθ
µ
φµD+µEΓ(µD
2
−mD)Γ(µE2 −mE)[Γ(mD)Γ(mE)]2
1
(2πj)6
∫
R1
· · ·
∫
R6
Γ
(
µD + µE −
∑6
j=1 rj
)
[
∏6
j=1 Γ(rj)]Γ(
µE
2
−mE − r1)Γ(µD2 −mD − r4)
Γ(µE − r1 − · · · − r3)
[
∏3
j=2 Γ(mE − rj)Γ(mD − rj+3)]
Γ(1 + µD − r4 − · · · − r6)
(√
ηEα2Ec1E − 1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r1(√ηEα2Ec1E − 1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r2
(√
ηEα2Ec2E − 1
φγ¯E
√
ηEα2E
)−r3( (ηD − 1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r4((√ηDα2Dc1D − 1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r5((√ηDα2Dc2D − 1)θ
φγ¯D
√
ηDα2D
)−r6
dr1 · · · dr6. (56)
With the help of [26, eq. (A.1)], the SOPL of (56) is expressed in exact closed-form as given in (21)
and this completes the proof.
For Case 2, SOPL can be computed by plugging (5) and (6) in (20) and utilising
∫∞
0
fγ(γ)dγ , 1.
Accordingly, this yields
SOPL = 1 + ΩDΩE
NE(mE ,µE)∑
iE=1
|ωiE |∑
jE=1
AiEjE
(jE − 1)!
ND(mD ,µD)∑
iD=1
|ωiD |∑
jD=1
BiDjD
(jD − 1)!
θjD−1
∫ ∞
0
γjD+jE−2E e
−
(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
θϑiD
γ¯D
)
γEdγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
K6
(57)
The above integral, K6, can be computed by using [27, eq. (3.381.4)] as follows
K6 = Γ(jD + jE − 1)(
ϑiE
γ¯E
+
θϑiD
γ¯D
)jD+jE−1 (58)
Substituting (58) in (57), the result is (22) and the proof is completed
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